Scottsdale Personal Injury Lawyer - Automobile Accidents - Most Popular

Intoxicated Scottsdale Man Smashes Three Patrol Cars

Chrissie Cole — Thu, 27 Aug 2009 15:16:00 GMT

A rowdy scene at Jade Palace restaurant in Scottsdale ended with one arrest and five wrecked cars on Wednesday night.

According to Scottsdale police, officers arrived at the restaurant and found Erin Bryant, 31, asleep in his pickup truck.

When officers approached the driver's window, Bryant began to back up and rammed into a police officer's patrol car, which struck two other vehicles in the parking lot, police said.

Bryant reversed direction and drove onto the hood of a second police car, and a third police vehicle -- a full-size SUV -- pinned Bryant's truck against the other cars, police said.

Officers continued to try and talk with Bryant but he physically resisted and police used a Taser stun gun to contain him.

While no one was injured, three police and two civilian vehicles sustained thousands of dollars in damage.

Bryant was arrested on several charges including driving under the influence, aggravated DUI, driving with a suspended license and more.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Chrissie Cole

No Personal Jurisdiction Over Across-the-Border Bar That Overserves Patron Killing Arizona Pedestrian

Geoff Trachtenberg — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 12:34:51 GMT

Interesting and disappointing personal jurisdiction memo opinion from Division One, Womack v. KC Arena. In short, KC operates a bar on the Nevada side of the Arizona-Nevada border, over served a patron who then drove across the state line and killed an Arizona pedestrian. Moreover, plaintiffs asserted that KC employees knew the patron lived in Bullhead City and that he would return there after he left the facility.

KC filed a motion to dismiss based upon a lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, asserted general and specific personal jurisdiction, and (smartly) requested the opportunity to conduct discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction. The trial court, however, granted KC's motion and Division One affirmed!

General personal jurisdiction over any claim against a defendant arises when the defendant has "substantial" or "continuous and systematic" contacts with the state. Though the record contained evidence that KC (1) advertises on television broadcasts in Arizona; (2) lists its establishment in various Arizona telephone directories; (3) employs Arizona residents; and (4) maintained an interactive website that has a "chat room" and solicits email, the Court of Appeals determined that these contacts were insufficient for general personal jurisdiction (they claimed to ignore the website since it was not, apparently, raised in the trial court).

Specific personal jurisdiction over a related claim against a defendant arises when (1) the defendant performed some act or consummated some transaction with the state by which it "purposefully availed" itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state; (2) the claim "arises out of or relates to" the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. KC argued that there was not a sufficient nexus between the plaintiffs' claim and KC's contacts with Arizona - namely, its local television advertising and telephone directory listings - to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction because those contacts are unrelated to the events giving rise to the plaintiffs' claims. The Court essentially agreed, focusing particularly on the fact that the events giving rise to the liability occurred in Nevada and that the location of the "injury causing event" in Arizona was irrelevant.

The Court also affirmed the trial court's exercise of discretion in denying the plaintiffs an opportunity to conduct discovery because, in essence, the Court concluded that the additional discovery would not have made a difference in the analysis. Don't you love that kind of logic - speculating on the outcome of the appeal based upon discovery that was not allowed?

Personally, Judge Barker's concurrence makes the most sense to me:

KC runs a bar that is immediately across the river from Arizona. Certainly, the business of the bar, and plaintiffs' claim, "relate[] to" the steady stream of patrons that come to the bar from Arizona and re-enter Arizona after frequenting the bar's premises. KC chose to locate its bar in that location. It initiated those contacts. It should not be jurisdictionally immune from the impact that it is having on Arizona residents when it sends intoxicated drivers onto Arizona highways.

But, alas, it is so immune.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Geoff Trachtenberg

Statutes and Rules that Require Mandatory Disclosure of Medical Records Violate HIPPA

Geoff Trachtenberg — Sat, 19 May 2007 20:34:46 GMT

Arizona requires mandatory disclosure of medical records in medical malpractice cases and, amazingly, is currently considering a change to mandatory arbitration procedures to require the same thing. As we have often explained, these provisions violate HIPPA, the comprehensive federal scheme that provides essential privacy rights for medical records.

The voice of reason is finally kicking in: the Georgia Supreme Court recently struck down their statute requiring mandatory disclosure of medical records in medical malpractice cases citing HIPPA preemption. The decision basically holds that the Georgia statute's failure to include provisions required by HIPPA, such as "the HIPAA requirement of notice of the right to revoke" or "the failure to require a specific and meaningful identification of the information to be disclosed and the failure to provide for an expiration date or a sufficient expiration event," makes the Georgia invalid in light of the preemptive effect of HIPPA.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Geoff Trachtenberg

Judicial Officers are Subject to the "De Facto Officer" Doctrine and Failure to Object to the Appointment of a Judge Pro Tempore is a Procedural Defect That Can Be Waived

Geoff Trachtenberg — Fri, 08 Jun 2007 08:49:57 GMT

Division One just handed down Garner v. Schindler, a short and sweet opinion on the nature of judges pro tempore (I am a judge pro tempore, by the way). In sum, the appellant had a probate dispute litigated before a judge pro tempore and, after the case was over, decided to raise (for the first time) hyper-technical defects in the judge's appointment.

The Court of Appeals, awknoweldged that there was a defect in the appointment of the judge pro tempore, but observed that the Supreme Court had previously applied the "de facto officer" doctrine in determining the validity of acts of other public officers whose appointment or election to the office was legally defective. The de facto officer doctrine applies as follows:

one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interests of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment [that would otherwise be] void by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public.

The Court recognized the sound policy behind the doctrie:

The de facto officer doctrine was developed to protect the public from the chaos and uncertainty that would ensue if actions taken by individuals apparently occupying government offices could later be invalidated by exposing defects in the officials' titles. The doctrine has generally been applied to individuals who are in possession of an office, are performing the duties of the office, and who maintain an appearance of right to the office.

The Court held that "[w]e do not perceive any reason why the doctrine of de facto officers . . . should not be extended to judges -- including judges pro tempore -- who occupy office under color of a known appointment that suffers from a procedural defect or irregularity that is unknown to the public." Indeed, "it makes little sense to waste 'valuable judicial and private resources' by '[r]equiring relitigation of matters decided by a competent, unbiased judge.'" "This is particularly so when, as here, the 'procedural defects in a judge's qualifications do not affect the fairness of the proceedings.'" Accordingly, the Court held that the de facto officer doctrine is applicable to judicial officers.

The Court then turned to whether the defect was "procedural" or "jurisdictional." The significance being that the former is subject to waiver, unlike the latter. The Court held that "the defect in the appointment process was a procedural error that [was] waived by not raising [it] before the probate hearing commenced."

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Geoff Trachtenberg

Driver Arrested For Manslaughter In Fatal Crash

Chrissie Cole — Tue, 17 Feb 2009 22:46:00 GMT

The driver of a vehicle involved in a fatal car accident on February, 8 in Scottsdale, has been charged with manslaughter.

The woman, 25, of Phoenix, was arrested last week after being treated and released from the hospital following the accident, according to police.

She was charged with one count of manslaughter and three counts of endangerment.

The investigation is still ongoing but police believe alcohol was likely involved in the accident which occurred at 6:00 a.m. when she rear-ended a Ford van at the intersection of Cactus and Scottsdale with her Saturn.

The backseat passenger of her vehicle, a woman, 24, was taken to John C. Lincoln North Mountain Hospital where she later died.

Another passenger also inside the Saturn, 35, of Mesa, was booked on one count of trespassing after fleeing the scene of the accident and being taken into custody in a nearby yard, police said.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Chrissie Cole

Arizona Supreme Court Finds No Workers' Compensation Offset for Underinsured Motorist Coverage

Geoff Trachtenberg — Thu, 10 Jan 2008 16:04:22 GMT

Today the Arizona Supreme Court issued an opinion in Cundiff v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. which dealt with workers' compensation offsets in underinsured motorist (UIM) claims.

Pima County Deputy Sheriff Jean Cundiff was injured by a third-party while on the job, in her patrol car. Although she was paid certain workers' compensation benefits, the third-party only carried $15,000 in liability coverage. So, after accepting these minimal limits, Ms. Cundiff made a UIM claim with her insurer, State Farm.

State Farm, however, had a term in its policy that provided for an offset against any UIM coverage based upon benefits received from a workers' compensation carrier. The provision stated that: "Any amount payable under [UIM] coverage shall be reduced by any amount paid or payable to or for the insured under any worker[s'] compensation, disability benefits, or similar law. This does not reduce the limits of liability required by law for this coverage."

The claim went to arbitration and Ms. Cundiff prevailed. Nevertheless, relying upon the foregoing provision, State Farm was only willing to pay a reduced amount of the arbitration award, i.e., an amount offset based upon the benefits Ms. Cundiff received from her workers' compensation carrier. So Ms. Cundiff sued State Farm for the full amount she was due pursuant to the arbitration award, without application of any offset.

The trial court and Court of Appeals (in a published decision) sided with State Farm, but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed these decisions. Based on the terms of the UIM statute, which override the terms of the State Farm policy, the Supreme Court explained that only "liability insurance" can be deducted from the full value of an insured's loss to reduce the amount of the claim -- that is, only proceeds received from a liability policy will be offset against the full value of an insured's claim. The Court explained that, since workers' compensation does not constitute "liability insurance," workers' compensation benefits cannot be offset against an insured's claim.

For more information on this subject, please refer to the section on Car and Motorcycle Accidents.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Geoff Trachtenberg

Court Holds Offer of Judgment Sanctions Include All Reasonable Expert Fees

Geoff Trachtenberg — Tue, 19 Jun 2007 17:18:40 GMT

Division One handed down Levy v. Alfaro today which holds that Rule 68 sanctions include all reasonable expert witness fees after the offer, not just those fees for testifying at trial. The decision is no surprise to those of us who regulaly try cases, but I suppose it is good to have it "clarified."

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Geoff Trachtenberg

Court of Appeals (Incorrectly) Dismisses Wrongful Death Appeal Due to Untimely Notice of Appeal After Plaintiff Attempts to Obtain a Change to the Breadth of the Trial Court's Judgment

Geoff Trachtenberg — Fri, 01 Jun 2007 15:00:33 GMT

Frank Zappa said, "We are a nation of laws; badly written and randomly enforced." That's probably the way that Joe Burkhamer feels, having lost his daughter (and son-in-law) in tragic accident in 2003, and now having had his appeal dismissed in a published opinion from Division Two, Burkhamer v. State of Arizona, because two of the three Judges on the panel decided that the appeal was filed too late.

Among other things, the case is an exercise in form over substance and a reminder of just how complicated the wrongful death statute is for people in the "real world." In Burkhamer, the parties (i.e., the surviving parents) blamed the State of Arizona for negligently designing and maintaining a road that caused the children's deaths. It is difficult to tell from the opinion, but it appears that Joe Burkhamer and his ex-wife had separate attorneys, separately filed their own Notices of Claim, but may have jointly filed an action against the State of Arizona, along with the parents of the other young man who was killed, altogether.

This, of course, is the first clue that things are squirrelly since we all know that, according to the Supreme Court's decision in Wilmot v. Wilmot, 203 Ariz. 565, 58 P.3d 507 (2002), "there is 'one action' for damages occasioned by a wrongful death," and there is "but one plaintiff, one of the persons designated by statute." So, at most, there should have been two plaintiffs in this case, one for the beneficiaries of the lost daughter and another for the beneficiaries of the lost son.

In any event, in what would have been an interesting and important appeal, Mr. Burkhamer delivered his own Notice of Claim via facsimile to the Arizona attorney general's office and, not surprisingly, the State moved to dismiss Mr. Burkhamer's claims and/or for partial summary judgment under the premise that his Notice of Claim was not properly served pursuant to A.R.S. Â§ 12-821.01. This would have been an important appeal because, unlike related counterparts, Rule 4.1(h), Ariz.R.Civ.Proc., provides that service upon the State is effected by merely "delivering" a copy of documents to the attorney general as opposed to "serving" such documents. Compare Rule 4.1(j), Ariz.R.Civ.Proc. (concerning service upon "other governmental entities," requires "serving" the appropriate legal officer).

The trial court, however, agreed with the State that such delivery was ineffective and entered a judgment (dated January 26) against Mr. Burkhamer, pursuant to Rule 54(b), stating that "this shall constitute the Court's Final Judgment dismissing all claims asserted by [him] against the State of Arizona in this matter." It is not clear when this judgment was submitted by the State, but a few days after the judgment was entered, Mr. Burkhamer filed an "Objection to Defendant's Final Judgment and Order Dismissing Claim."

Again, something seems squirrelly because Rule 58(d), Ariz.R.Civ.Proc., provides a mechanism to object to the form of a judgment. That Rule requires that no judgment may be entered until "five days after the proposed form [of judgment] . . . has been served upon opposing counsel." Either the Judgment was entered too soon (which should make it defective, something which is not addressed in the opinion and something that Mr. Burkhamer appears to have belatedly argued and waived, Â¶34) or Mr. Burkhamer's Objection came too late. Anyway, the Objection is a document that becomes the centerpiece of why the appeal was dismissed, and Rule 58(d) becomes important later.

In the Objection, Mr. Burkhamer objected to the Judgment on the ground its language "dismissing all [his] claims" was "overbroad" because the trial court supposedly had agreed at the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss that, even though it was dismissing his claim, he could still file a motion to amend the pleadings "to assert a claim as a beneficiary of the claim of Plaintiff Marjorie Surine [i.e., Mr. Burkhamer's ex-wife] in her status as the statutory plaintiff for the wrongful death claim."

Yet again, something seems squirrelly because why would Mr. Burkhamer be able to amend pleadings to assert a claim brought on behalf of another plaintiff for his benefit? This makes no sense. Anyway, about a week later, Mr. Burkhamer also filed a motion to amend the pleadings, seeking permission "to continue his involvement in this case" as a nonparty, statutory beneficiary under his ex-wife's claim and asking for "his damages [to] be considered in any award ultimately determined in this matter." Evidently, the trial court did not see things the way Mr. Burkhamer saw them and, after a hearing on that motion, the trial court signed an order (dated May 22) denying both Mr. Burkhamer's motion to amend as well as his Objection to the Judgment.

If you are keeping track of time, you might realize that Mr. Burkhamer is about to have a problem. Mr. Burkhamer filed a notice of appeal on June 19 to both the January 26 judgment and the May 22 order. The timeliness of the appeal became an issue because June 19 is "more than thirty days after the trial court's entry of judgment" on January 26 and, of course, you generally must file a notice of appeal within 30 days to perfect an appeal.

The Court of Appeals, however, recognized that there are various exceptions to the 30-day rule, including where a party files a motion to "alter of amend the judgment" pursuant to Rule 59(l), Ariz.R.Civ.Proc. And this is where the rubber hits the road with respect the Objection -- namely, whether Mr. Burkhamer's Objection was a motion to "alter of amend the judgment."

While the majority in Burkhamer acknowledged that, in determining whether a filing constitutes motion to "alter of amend the judgment" pursuant to Rule 59(l), it is the substance of the document that controls -- i.e., not the title or "magic incantations" stated in the brief -- the Court held that, since Mr. Burkhamer's Objection "neither cited nor otherwise referred to Rule 59, or any of its grounds, or any other civil procedure rule" and because "[n]othing in the record here suggests that the trial court treated Burkhamer's objection to the judgment as one of the time-extending motions prescribed in ARCAP 9(b)," it would not be considered a motion to "alter of amend the judgment" pursuant to Rule 59(l). As a result, Mr. Burkhamer's notice of appeal was untimely.

As you might imagine, Mr. Burkhamer argued that his Objection to the judgment should "be treated as a Rule 59(l) motion" because "[t]he substance of [his] objection was a request that the [trial] court amend or alter the January 26 [judgment] so as to permit him to participate as a wrongful death beneficiary." In my view, this is where the majority lost its focus and made a mistake.

Rather than address whether the "substance" of the Objection was indeed a request to "alter or amended the judgment," the majority said they were not persuaded because (1) the Objection "did not cite Rule 59(l ) or any other rule"; (2) "although Burkhamer complained in his objection that the trial court's judgment was 'overbroad,' he did not expressly ask the court to 'alter or amend' it"; (3) "before alternatively arguing in his reply brief that his objection should be treated as a Rule 59(l) motion, Burkhamer characterized that filing as a 'Rule 58(d)[, Ariz.R. Civ. P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 2,] objection' to the trial court's proposed judgment"; and (4) "that the trial court held a hearing on Burkhamer's motion to amend the pleadings and ultimately denied that motion as well as Burkhamer's objection to the judgment does not suggest the court treated that objection as a Rule 59(l) motion."

None of these reasons address the substance of the Objection, which was clearly a request to modify or alter the judgment.

Taking these in turn, the fact that Mr. Burkhamer "did not cite Rule 59(l)" is the epitome of placing "form over substance." Our Rules do not require "magic words or phrases."

The fact that Mr. Burkhamer "did not expressly ask the court to 'alter or amend' [the judgment]" is a similar technicality and misses the point. Mr. Burkhamer clearly intended -- whether expressly or implicitly -- that the trial court "alter or amend" the judgment. He called it "overbroad" since it applied to "all" of his claims, and was clearly asking the trial court to change it so that he could still "assert a claim as a beneficiary." If that is not substantively asking the court to "alter or amend" the Judgment, then what is? Just the fact that it was filed after the Judgment was entered is evidence that it is a request to "alter or amend" the Judgment.

The fact Mr. Burkhamer once characterized the filing as a Rule 58(d) filing is, in a word, unfortunate but should not bear on the substance. Focusing on the mere fact that it was once referred to as a Rule 58(d) filing is really no different than focusing on the fact that he "failed to cite Rule 59(l)" or that it is titled "Objection." The issue is not the citation to particular Rules or the title of the document, it is the substance of what was being asked of the trial court and, frankly, Mr. Burkhamer's Objection simply could not have been a Rule 58(d) filing since we know it came after the Judgment was entered and Rule 58(d) is clearly only applicable to filings before Judgment is entered.

And, lastly, notwithstanding "how the court treated [the] objection," the case law that the majority relied upon, e.g., Farmers Insurance Co. v. Vagnozzi, 132 Ariz. 219, 644 P.2d 1305 (1982), did not require that the trial court had to treat the document as a Rule 59(l) request if the document itself substantively made such a request. To the contrary, the case law simply stated that "when the trial court has stated in the record its intention to do so" then the request will be treated as a Rule 59 request and extend the time for appeal. So whether the trial court did or did not treat Mr. Burkhamer's request as one under Rule 59(l) should have no bearing on whether it, in fact, was substantively a request to "alter or amend" the Judgment.

Although Mr. Burkhamer went on to posit an alternative argument -- namely, that his appeal was at least timely as to the May 22 order and it was that order that adjudicated his claim to participate as a beneficiary -- the Court (correctly) shot down this argument since Judgment clearly adjudicated "all claims," but something the Court said in connection with addressing this contention undermines its earlier reasoning. That is, the Court said "Burkhamer's own objection to the trial court's judgment, in which he claimed the judgment was 'overbroad,' belies his argument. That objection manifested Burkhamer's valid concern that the judgment, as framed and filed by the trial court, in fact disposed of any and all claims Burkhamer might have had in this action." Precisely! And that is why the majority is wrong -- i.e., because the "objection manifested Burkhamer's . . . concern that the judgment . . . disposed of any and all claims" and he clearly wanted that to be "altered or amended."

And, finally, Mr. Burkhamer argued that the Court should disregard the Rule 54(b) certification on the Judgment and deem the Judgment as premature because his claim -- as a statutory beneficiary -- could not possibly have been resolved. Once, again, I think Mr. Burkhamer is correct on the appeal (although this is not the way he chose to pursue the case in the trial court). Relying upon the fact that there is supposed to be a single plaintiff that presents all the claims of the statutory beneficiaries, Mr. Burkhamer argued that the Rule 54(b) certification in the Judgment was not appropriate.

Since "there is but 'one' plaintiff and 'one' judgment" in wrongful death case, it does not make sense that there could a Rule 54(b) judgment as to one beneficiary while leaving the others to continue litigating (unless, of course, that party was held not to be an actual statutory beneficiary for some reason, which is not the case here). Yet the Court of Appeals expressly rejected this, holding that "none of the authorities on which Burkhamer relies precludes a trial court in a wrongful death case from disposing of all claims made by a person, whether as a statutory plaintiff or as a nonplaintiff, statutory beneficiary, via a separate, but final, appealable judgment that applies only to that particular claimant." Such a conclusion, however, makes no practical sense and violates the one plaintiff, one judgment rule.

As already noted, the Court's decision was two to one and I obviously side with the dissent, but I also think this case (regardless of whether the Supreme Court accepts review of this opinion) is not over for Mr. Burkhamer. Frankly, notwithstanding the Court of Appeal's opinion, I think his ex-wife had (and still has) a fiduciary duty under Wilmot to pursue and protect Mr. Burkhamer's claims and that she may have already abdicated her fiduciary duty by failing to properly preserve and protect his claims. She may also have problems because she was hostile to his appeal (e.g., like the State, she also raised the timeliness issue, Â¶ 6, Note 2).

Anyway, this is a mess of a case and the outcome is about as arbitrary as I have ever seen.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Geoff Trachtenberg

Arizona Court of Appeals Describes the Quantum of Evidence Needed to Prove Lost Earning Capacity and Addresses Damages for the "Increased Risk" of Harm

Geoff Trachtenberg — Wed, 23 May 2007 13:40:19 GMT

New case from Division One, Felder v. Physiotherapy Assoc., that has some good stuff in it concerning lost earning capacity and anxiety over the "increased risk" of harm.

The first and main issue in the case concerns the quantum of evidence needed to prove lost earning capacity. Although the standard is "reasonable certainty" in predicting the future in such cases, the Court "conclude[d] that when determining what constitutes 'reasonable certainty' as to the amount of damages in a personal injury action, the key consideration must be what is 'reasonable' under the circumstances of the particular case."

So, what does this "case-by-case" rule mean? Read on. The Court explained:

Some cases will simply not be conducive to a high degree of certainty because the future itself is uncertain. This does not, however, deprive an injured plaintiff of a remedy. A plaintiff may still claim damages in an amount supported by the best evidence available and the essential consideration is that "the jury must be guided by some rational standard."

This is helpful because it basically says, "look, we understand that predicting the future is always going to be somewhat speculative, but as long as there is some 'rational standard' that governs such a forecast, we will leave it to the jury to make the final determination." Since defense counsel are typically very persistent in claiming that such calculations are "speculative" and, therefore, worthless, this case ensures that at least Judges will be better equipped to deal with these kinds of arguments.

The second significant issue in the case concerned whether the plaintiff was allowed to seek damages for "anxiety" over his "less than 1% chance of neovascularization." This may seem inconsequential at first blush, but this is the cutting edge of tort law - i.e., the ability to recover due to the "increased risk" of an injury.

Our case law has not really addressed this issue very well and there is a case, DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, 605, 744 P.2d 705, 706 (App. 1987), in which the plaintiff sought to recover damages for emotional harm absent any physical injury, based on plaintiff's "increased risk" of contracting asbestosis or lung cancer. The plaintiff was not allowed to recover for the "increased risk" in that case.

The Felder court distinguished the DeStories case because, while there was serious physical harm to Mr. Felder, there was "no physical injury" in the DeStories case. While I like the outcome, this is intellectually disingenuous in my view since the "serious physical harm" was beside the point. The point was that, while Mr. Felder had a "increased risk" of neovascularization, he did not have any neovascularization. Great result, but I wish they had simply overruled or modified DeStories instead of pretend it was truly distinguishable.

[Incidently, there is another case on the books, Monaco v. HealthPartners, which distinguishes DeStories and holds that fear of future cancer is compensable.]

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Geoff Trachtenberg

Trial Scheduled In Vehicle Collision Case Involving a Commercial Truck

Geoff Trachtenberg — Thu, 26 Apr 2007 13:41:23 GMT

Over three years ago, our client was a passenger in a vehicle driving on U.S. 60 in La Paz County. Unfortunately, a truck driver that had stopped at an intersection on the highway, proceeded to cross the intersection and did not see our client's vehicle approaching.

The vehicles collided, resulting in serious injuries to our client and another passenger.

As is sometimes the case, even though the truck driver admitted he felt at fault for the collision, the driver, employer and/or insurance company refuses to admit the driver is at fault or acknowledge the full nature and extent of our client's injuries. Indeed, the defendants do not even concede that our client was entitled to be transported to a Level One trauma facility by helicopter (she was considered a Level One trauma, the most serious classification, at the scene) or that he stay in the hospital for several days was proper.

We are scheduled to go to trial in August, 2007 in La Paz County, Arizona. Among other things, the defendants have indicated through their counsel that they do not think a La Paz County jury will give our client any sizeable award. While verdicts are certainly lower in outside counties, you should never be afraid to take a meritorious case to trial or be bullied into an unfair settlement. In addition, we believe the defendants are in for a surprise.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Geoff Trachtenberg